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Abstract
Countermeasures, or techniques for hiding guilt during a credibility assessment examination, have long
been an important topic in cognitive psychology and criminal justice fields. With recent IS research on
automated screening systems, understanding the potential for countermeasures in this new paradigm is of
increasing importance. This paper reports on a large experiment examining countermeasures in an
automated deception detection screening context. The effectiveness of traditional countermeasure types
(mental and physical) are examined, as well as an exploratory approach of trying several countermeasures
at once. The exploratory approach was tested to investigate a proposed novel systems-inspired solution to
countermeasures—triangulating on deception likelihood using multiple sensors measuring multiple
behavioral and psychophysiological anomalies. The findings give credence to the proposition that
monitoring multiple heterogeneous cues to deception may be a viable solution for mitigating the
effectiveness of countermeasures.
Keywords: Countermeasures Mitigation Systems, Deception Detection Systems, Automated Screening
Systems, Automated Screening Kiosk

Introduction
For almost as long there have been systematic methods for detecting deception, there have been tools for
mitigating their effectiveness. This is especially true for the polygraph, which is the most widely known
and widely used technology designed to augment human interviewers in credibility assessment (Honts
and Perry 1992). Research suggests that countermeasures can be effectively used against the traditional
polygraph sensors for both the Control Question Technique (CQT) as well as the Concealed Information
Test (CIT) method of interviewing (Ben-Shakhar and Dolev 1996; Elaad and Ben-Shakhar 1991; Honts and
Kircher 1994; Honts et al. 1987).
The effectiveness of countermeasures have been of particular interest to the cognitive psychology and
criminal justice fields, and now is of increasing interest to IS research investigating systems solutions to
integrity screening and credibility assessment systems. New system designs are being evaluated and
validated for the purpose of conducting more rapid, non-contact credibility assessment interviews, and to
gain more insight into the underlying mechanics of credibility assessment (Derrick et al. 2011; Nunamaker
et al. 2011; Twyman 2012; Twyman et al. 2011b). For example, eye tracking and vocalic measures of
deception and concealed information have been a focus of recent automated interviewing research (Elkins
et al. 2012b; Nunamaker Jr et al. 2012; Proudfoot et al. 2012; Proudfoot et al. 2013; Twyman et al. 2013),
and have provided new insights into psychophysiological and behavioral correlates of deception. As
non-contact, automated credibility assessments emerge as an enticing option for managing security and
integrity, it is critical to identify and investigate possible countermeasures that may be employed.
This paper presents the findings of a study designed to evaluate the effectiveness of a variety of
countermeasures against a system interaction designed to identify deception and concealed information.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: (1) we discuss relevant deception detection and
countermeasures literature, (2) we outline our research approach, which includes a high-level system
design and laboratory experiment used to test countermeasures against an array of sensors, (3) we present
the results of the experiment, and (4) we review the contributions, limitations, and conclusions of this
work.

Literature Review
Technology has been used in credibility assessment interviews since at least 1895, when Cesare Lombroso,
an Italian criminologist, used a medical device for measuring blood pressure changes during police
interrogations (Trovillo 1939). In the 1920s and 30s, John Larson and Leonarde Keeler developed the
now-widely-known polygraph machine which measures blood pressure, respiration, and skin conductance
(a measure of arousal) (Alder 1998). Polygraph systems have since become the standard tool and decision
support system for credibility assessment interviews. The polygraph and its associated control question
technique of interviewing have not undergone major updates for many decades. Limitations to this current
paradigm limit the potential application and usefulness of human credibility assessment. Research in
several fields is seeking to update and improve upon existing knowledge and practices in this area of
research, which has potential for high impact. Because of a general scientific consensus that the most
common polygraph technique lacks validity (Iacono and Lykken 1997; National Research Council 2003),
much academic research on credibility assessment focuses on alternative techniques such as the CIT that
feature more control (Lykken 1998; MacLaren 2001; Rosenfeld and Labkovsky 2010b; Twyman et al.
2011b; Twyman et al. 2010; Vrij 2008).
Technology can clearly improve deception detection accuracy. Unaided human deception detection
accuracy rates hover near chance levels (Bond and DePaulo 2006). Decision support or fully automated
credibility assessment are an important area where IS research can make a substantial impact. Recently,
additional technologies for human screening have been investigated, including non-contact technologies
for measuring heart rate and blood pressure (Nunamaker et al. 2011), vocalic features (Elkins and
Burgoon 2010; Gamer et al. 2006; Harnsberger et al. 2009), linguistic variables (Fuller et al. 2009; Vizer
et al. 2009; Zhou and Zhang 2008), oculometric factors (Fukuda 2001; Osher 2007; Twyman 2012),
thermal features (Pavlidis et al. 2002; Pavlidis and Levine 2002), and kinesic factors (Meservy et al. 2005;
Twyman et al. 2011b). Beyond individual technologies, automated system designs are now beginning to be

1

proposed, designs that cover the interview protocol, technologies, and interaction facilitation (Derrick et
al. 2011; Nunamaker et al. 2011; Twyman et al. 2011a).
Just as no veracity cue has proven to be a “pinnochio’s nose,” or guaranteed sign of deception, no single
technology seeking to measure a physiological or behavioral process will be foolproof. It is thus critical
that research in this area be contextualized, clearly explaining boundaries and limitations for a given
design or approach. For the current study, we focus on fully automated screening system interviews, and
specifically automated systems employing a CIT-based interview.
The human-computer interaction (HCI) with automated screening systems is of particular importance,
because the system must comprehend and adapt to signals from the human that are not traditionally
monitored, such as body language or vocal patterns (Derrick et al., 2011). The best human signals to
monitor need to be identified. Because of the lack of a single clear signal indicating deception, many
signals will need to be monitored simultaneously. Perhaps most importantly, the interaction itself must be
specially designed to elicit valid signals (Twyman et al., 2011a).
An important aim of this research is to gain a greater understanding of the robustness of the system
interaction design when users attempt to manipulate the system in their favor. Unlike traditional
human-computer interactions where the system supports the user or the system and user complement one
another (Nass, Fogg, and Moon, 1996), the HCI of an automated screening system can at times consist of
the system and human trying to reach opposite goals. In such cases, the way the individual interacts with
the system will be strongly affected by their knowledge of the system’s monitoring and their own
countermeasures, or tactics employed to counter the system’s screening effectiveness. Understanding such
tactics and their effectiveness will provide insight into future iterations of the system and interaction
design. For instance, a recent conceptualization of as HCI framework for automated screening systems
mimics human interpersonal interactions, considering humans will interact with such systems as they
would another person (Derrick et al., 2011), reflecting the Computers-are-Social-Actors (CASA) paradigm
(Sundar and Nass, 2000; Reeves & Nass, 1996). However, when an individual is highly motivated to
counter or subvert a system, he or she will more strongly consider the source of the interview, and
therefore may not view the system as a social actor (Liang et al, 2013), but rather as a tool to be
manipulated. The tactics taken by a user, then, would produce different observable behaviors than a
manipulation seen in an interpersonal communication, especially if the manipulator understands how the
automated screening system works.
Automated screening systems are a novel solution to novel contexts, and as such, much research is needed
in this area. To the extent countermeasures are found to be effective, the system and interaction design
will need to be specified for the detection of, adaptation to, or minimization of the effectiveness of
countermeasures. In the remainder of this section we review deception theory generally and CIT-based
screening systems in particular, then focus on countermeasures and how they relate to several promising
non-contact technologies used in recent automated screening systems research.

Deception Theory
Deception occurs in many forms. For example, it can take the form of exaggeration, white lies,
equivocation, complete fabrications, and impostership. We define deception as an intentional
transmission of a message intended to foster false beliefs or perceptions in the recipient (Knapp &
Comadena, 1979). This definition of deception emphasizes the involvement of both a sender and receiver
during a deceptive interaction. During this interaction, deception theories explain and predict verbal,
nonverbal, and physiological behavior differences between truthtellers and deceivers.
The earliest investigations into deception, from which modern theories have stemmed, were conducted by
Ekman and Friesen (1969). They introduced their leakage hypothesis that predicted liars when
experiencing arousal, negative affect, and stress would leak unintentional cues that would manifest
particularly in the hands, legs, and feet. While experiencing these negative feelings, liars relieve their
tension and discomfort through adaptors (i.e., foot tapping, touching of face). In addition to additional
arousal induced behaviors, the leakage hypothesis predicts that liars will also inhibit certain behaviors and
natural gesturing.
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Later, Zuckerman, DePaulo, and Rosenthal (1981) extended this hypothesis with their Four-Factor theory
to more directly explain the causes for the behavior differences between liars and truthtellers. This theory
predicts leakage behavior is caused by 1) arousal, 2) negative affect, 3) cognitive effort, and 4) behavioral
control. Liars not only are predicted to exhibit leakage cues or adaptors due to arousal and negative affect,
but also experience more cognitive overload while managing their lie and appearance. This increased
vigilance in appearance also causes over-control of normally automatic and natural interaction gesturing,
causing rigid and inhibited behavior. If a liar does not experience fear or arousal, then cognitive or
behavioral control cues would be more diagnostic.
During communication, people attempt to manage and create an impression of themselves (Jones &
Pittman 1982). This self-presentational perspective was applied to deception theory by DePaulo (1992) to
elaborate on how behavioral control affects deceivers. Liars attempt to present themselves as truthful and
honest through their verbal and nonverbal behavior. Because they are consciously modifying their
behavior, it appears unnatural or artificially inhibits gesturing. This perspective predicts that a liar’s
behavior will be moderated by their communication ability, motivation, and confidence.
Buller and Burgoon introduced Interpersonal Deception Theory (1996) to include the entire deceptive
interaction. This theory emphasizes that deception is strategic and involves a complex interaction between
at least two people. Depending on the skill of the liar and their relationship in the interaction (e.g., boss,
parent, loved one), they are predicted to employ different strategies for managing a credible presentation.
Time and the interplay between sender and receiver are important additions to this theory. A liar may
start out feeling confident and reveal few behavioral cues to deception, but after sensing suspicion, begin
over compensating and exhibiting unnatural gestures. As the conversation continues, they may have to
think harder to keep their lie credible and consistent, leading to increased cognitive effort induced
behavior.

CIT-based Automated Interviewing Systems
Traditional interviewing methods designed to identify deception often require a time consuming process
during which preliminary interviews are conducted and interviewees are directly queried concerning their
involvement in a given crime or incident of interest. In some cases, homogeneous physiological measures
are recorded concurrently, providing the interviewer with data to scrutinize when making a credibility
assessment. The interviewer then utilizes a combination of both objective data and subjective observations
to render a decision. This process may yield inaccurate veracity judgments as data may be misinterpreted
or subjective judgments may overrule objective data.
To remedy this approach, an alternative interviewing method was proposed several decades ago, which
has since been heavily researched and validated in the scientific community. This method is the Concealed
Information Test (CIT), also known as the Guilty Knowledge Test (GKT) (Lykken 1959; Lykken 1960). The
CIT was developed with the purpose of identifying a person's knowledge of a given event or piece of
information by judging whether he or she perceives event-relevant information to be personally
significant. For example, a suspect accused of robbing a bank could be tested on his or her familiarity with
the type of door on the bank vault or the amount of money that was stolen. Because this approach
produces a strong individual baseline of comparison it has a significantly reduced rate of false positives.
During a CIT interview, an individual is presented with a question or statement together with groups of
stimuli referred to as foils. Foils are comprised of two types of stimuli, target items and nontarget items. A
target item is a stimulus that is related to the crime or information of interest, one that should elicit an
atypical physiological or behavioral response from someone who recognizes it. Nontarget items are mixed
in with the target items in each foil to serve as controls; they should not elicit any differences from truthful
or deceptive individuals. The strength of the CIT is found in administering a test comprised of several foils
as the chances are low of a truthful individual randomly exhibiting indications of concealed knowledge on
several target items. Another strength is the more objective nature of both administering and interpreting
results from the interview.
While commonly researched from the perspective of criminal justice or applied psychology, IS researchers
are also leveraging the simplicity and control of the CIT for conducting automated credibility assessments.
For example, CITs are now being evaluated in security screening scenarios (Proudfoot et al. 2012; Twyman
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2012; Twyman et al. 2011a) and for use in survey tools while keystrokes are recorded and analyzed to
identify deception and concealed information (Valacich et al. 2013).

Countermeasures
Because psychophysiological deception detection is based on detecting a physiological response to a
stimulus, the employment of measures used to appear innocent is a threat to the validity of any test.
Countermeasures have been shown to be effective in many deception detection tests, including the
polygraph (e.g., Ben-Shakhar and Dolev 1996; Honts et al. 1996; Honts et al. 1985; Honts et al. 1987),
P300-based neural activity detection tests (e.g., Rosenfeld et al. 2004; Sokolovsky et al. 2011), and
fMRI-based tests (Ganis et al. 2011).
In the case of the CQT and the CIT, the psychophysiological detection of deception is based on responses
differing from irrelevant to relevant items. In the case of the CQT, the expected difference in response is
between control questions and relevant questions. For the CIT, the difference is between nontarget and
target items. In either case, the response differing in the expected direction indicates the presence of
deception.
Countermeasures function primarily by manipulating the participant’s response to the irrelevant items to
minimize the difference when the relevant item or question is asked. Countermeasures fall primarily into
two categories: mental and physical. Physical countermeasures include finger movements (Ganis et al.
2011), pressing toes against the floor (Honts et al. 1996; Honts et al. 1985; Honts et al. 1987), or biting the
tongue (Honts et al. 1985; Honts et al. 1987). These physical countermeasures are employed during a
portion of the irrelevant items in either a CQT or CIT. They work by creating a similar physiological
response to irrelevant items to what the guilty show during relevant items. Mental countermeasures
include mental counting (Elaad and Ben-Shakhar 1991; Honts et al. 1996), recalling past emotional events
(Ben-Shakhar and Dolev 1996), or simply saying your first and last name in your head (Sokolovsky et al.
2011).
Depending on the test, mental countermeasures are either employed during the irrelevant items only or
during all items. For example, in a polygraph-based study Elaad and Ben-Shakhar (1991) found that
item-specific mental countermeasures (counting to 10 during the relevant stimulus) increased the overall
response and made detection easier. On the other hand, counting sheep throughout the length of the test
decreased detection rates. In a P300-based deception detection experiment Sokolovsky et al. (2011)
showed that participants who silently said their first and last name during two of four irrelevant stimuli
were able to modify their responses enough to evade detection.
Where countermeasures are shown to be effective at manipulating deception detection results, cognitive
psychology research has turned to detecting countermeasures. Physical countermeasures are especially
vulnerable to detection. Honts et al. (Honts et al. 1987) showed that 90% of countermeasures users were
identified using an electromyograph used to measure muscle activity in the legs and head. Similarly, Ganis
et al. (2011) showed that while slight finger movements reduced detection accuracy in fMRI-based tests,
they also increased activation of the motor cortex, the part of the brain responsible for movement.
Increases in reaction time allowed countermeasure detection in P300 mental countermeasures (Rosenfeld
et al. 2008). The identification of effective countermeasures allows researchers to discover ways to detect
them.
This paper proposes a slightly different approach to mitigating countermeasures. In addition to
investigating the effectiveness of traditional countermeasures on new, non-contact sensors, we propose
increasing the number and heterogeneity of veracity cues tracked and used in decision making. If
individuals can be simultaneously attentive to a limited number of activities, then they are less likely to be
able to counter a credibility assessment system when the system tracks and measures many heterogeneous
human factors.
Pupil Dilation
Changes in pupil dilation can be linked with a number of cognitive functions. Preliminary research
discovered that changes in pupild dilation can be used to identify activation and arousal in autonomic
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activity (Goldwater 1972; Nunnally et al. 1967). Additionally, differences in pupillary responses have been
linked with short-term and long-term memory retrieval (Beatty and Kahneman 1966; Gardner et al. 1975;
Janisse 1977). A study investigating differences in pupil dilation associated with viewing novel and
repeated stimuli revealed that pupils exhibit increased dilation when repeatedly exposed to a given
stimulus (Heaver 2011). The authors referred to this as the Pupil Old/New Effect, or PONE. Additional
work has replicated this (Maw and Pomplun 2004).
The orienting response is traditionally the gold-standard human factor of interest in a CIT, and tracking
electrodermal activity (skin sweatiness) is the standard method for measuring the orienting response.
However, the physiological activation triggered by the orienting response is not limited to electrodermal
activity alone. Several physiological changes result, among them being pupil dilation. Within CIT research,
evidence supports the notion that common mechanism triggers both pupil dilation and electrodermal
activity in response to concealed knowledge (Bradley et al. 2008). Additionally, changes in pupil dilation
during a CIT are attributable to simply having concealed knowledge and not necessarily to any concurrent
deceptive behaviors, such as verbally lying (Janisse and Bradley 1980).
The use of pupil dilation as a cue to deception is dependent on the differential response to the target item.
The arousal triggered by recognition of the target item causes the pupil to dilate to a much greater extent
than when viewing other items. The employment of mental countermeasures to artificially increase
pupillary response to non-target items could help artificially raise the baseline of comparison, resulting in
a less accurate determination of deception. Because pupil dilation is related to cognitive processing
(Kahneman 1973), taxing mental tasks can increase pupil dilation on demand. By performing mental
arithmetic during non-target items, the pupillary response during the target item can thereby be masked.
Thus, we predict the following:



H1: Deceptive individuals will have a larger pupillary response to target items than to non-target
items.
H2: Deceptive individuals using mental countermeasures will exhibit reduced pupil dilation
differential between target and non-target items compared to deceptive individuals using no
countermeasures.

In addition to cognitive effort, pupil dilation can also be triggered by pain. Using electrical stimulation,
Chapman et al. (1999) showed that pupil dilation increases nearly immediately at the onset of pain, and
that this dilation increases with increasing pain intensity. Further research has shown that the pupil
dilation is not only immediate, but lasts for the duration of the pain (Ellermeier and Westphal 1995).
These results indicate that physical countermeasures such as biting the tongue, as employed in polygraph
studies, may also work to artificially manipulate the pupil dilation baseline in an automated CIT screening
paradigm. As with mental countermeasures, causing pain during non-target items should increase the
pupil dilation, reducing the difference between target and non-target pupil dilation in a CIT.


H3: Physical countermeasures will reduce the pupil dilation differential between target and
non-target items.

Kinesic Rigidity
Kinesic rigidity is the constriction of body movement. Rigidity has been found in communication research
to be an indicator of low veracity during open-ended or semi-structured interviewing techniques (Caso et
al. 2006; Vrij and Mann 2001). When lying, participants tend to exhibit less overall movement, especially
expressive or illustrative gestures, and the movement that does occur tends to be spatially constricted and
appear forced rather than natural (Buller and Aune 1987; Vrij and Mann 2001; Vrij et al. 1996). Recent IS
research has discovered that this phenomenon is also present in the more controlled CIT interview setting,
and has developed a method for automatic detection of rigidity via comparison of body movement during
baseline items to body movement during target items (Twyman et al. 2011b).
Likely because of the high cost of traditional measurement of rigidity, this cue to deception is not used in
practice. It has also received almost no attention in countermeasures research. One psychology study
determined that controlling rigidity is very difficult in semi-structured interviews, at least when trying to
control it directly (Vrij et al. 1996). However, there are still many unknowns, including the effectiveness of
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traditional countermeasures, and how well rigidity can be overtly controlled in a highly controlled
automated screening setting where many behaviors must be controlled simultaneously.
In semi-structured interviews, rigidity has been hypothesized to stem from cognitive overload, in that
more cognitive effort is being placed on mentally constructing and relaying a plausible story, leaving fewer
resources to allocate toward nonverbal presentation, creating less overall movement and more constricted
movement (DePaulo et al. 1988; Ekman and Friesen 1972). A second theory suggests that rigidity itself
may be a form of countermeasure, in that because people generally falsely believe that liars exhibit
increased movement, they purposely minimize their own movement to appear truthful (DePaulo and
Kirkendol 1989). A third possible explanation is the biologically-driven freeze response that all humans
experience when confronted with something that is threatening (Gray 1988). Previous IS research
discovered rigidity in a CIT, which requires no communicative or illustrative movement, so cognitive
overload will not be a likely driver in the highly controlled, automated format employed by the system
design we use. It is possible that the root cause is a combination of the freeze response and behavioral
control.
The effectiveness of traditional countermeasures on kinesic rigidity is likely low. Physical countermeasures
do not eliminate the threat or the desire to appear truthful. Mental countermeasures should be effective to
the extent they not only cognitively distract the examinee, but also help them ignore the potential threat or
the desire to appear truthful. However, because individuals have to verbally respond and be visually
attentive, mental countermeasures are limited in how much they can distract. Much research is needed to
understand these dynamics, but at this early stage it appears unlikely that traditional countermeasures
will be particularly effective against the rigidity effect.



H4: Deceptive individuals will exhibit less overall movement when viewing and responding to a
target item.
H5: Deceptive individuals employing mental or physical countermeasures will exhibit less overall
movement when viewing and responding to a target item.

Vocal Pitch
Vocalics refer to the nonverbal elements of speech. To speak, the diaphragm pushes air out from the lungs,
through the vibrating vocal folds (Titze and Martin 1998). The frequency of the air affected by the
vibration of the vocal folds is perceived as the vocal pitch. The intensity of the air pushed by the diaphragm
is perceived as the volume or loudness of the sound. The vocal fold vibrations are facilitated by muscles
about the larynx in the vocal tract. Just like other muscles in the body, when an individual experiences
stress or arousal the larynx exhibits tension. Tension around the larynx cause the vocal folds to increase
the frequency of vibration, thereby increasing the overall variation of vocal pitch.
Increases in mean and range in vocal pitch have been predictive of deceptive speech (DePaulo et al. 2003;
Elkins et al. 2012a; Rockwell et al. 1997) and heightened emotions and arousal (Bachorowski and Owren
1995; Scherer et al. 2003). Because vocal pitch provides primarily emotional arousal-based information, it
has not traditionally been included in a CIT, which emphasizes orienting responses resulting from
cognitive arousal. However, it is likely that emotional arousal may be present in the CIT even though it has
not traditionally been measured. Participants may have relatively heightened feelings of fear or anxiety
during a CIT.


H6: Deceptive individuals will exhibit greater variation in voice pitch when responding to a target
item.

Mental countermeasures are expected to be effective for the same reasons as stated previously, specifically
its distracting qualities. However, physical countermeasures may not cause tension in the larynx, which
would negate their potential effectiveness.


H7: Deceptive individuals using mental countermeasures will exhibit reduced vocal pitch variation
differential between target and non-target items compared to deceptive individuals using no
countermeasures.
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H8: Deceptive individuals employing physical countermeasures will exhibit greater vocal pitch
when viewing and responding to a target item.

It is especially important to determine whether individuals can be successful when they attempt to counter
many factors at once. Thus, in addition to testing these eight hypotheses, we also investigate whether
countermeasures are less effective when multiple countermeasures are employed at once.

Research Approach
This study followed a design science research (DSR) approach, in which knowledge is discovered through
the design, implementation, and evaluation of system prototypes (Gregor and Hevner 2013; Hevner et al.
2004; Nunamaker and Briggs 2011; Nunamaker et al. 1991; Nunamaker et al. 2013). In particular, it
adheres to the broad-based, high-impact model of DSR, where multidisciplinary programs of research
pursue solutions to major issues through sustained, interrelated projects that build on one another
(Nunamaker et al. 2013). Projects iterate through prototyping, experimentation, field studies, and
theoretical development in a nonlinear fashion. Persistent, sustained projects use the most expedient
research methods in their quest to push solutions from initial ideation to 1) a proof-of-concept stage,
where there is sufficient evidence that a concept can work, to 2) a proof-of-value stage, where there is
sufficient evidence that a concept does work and adds value to real-world situations, to 3) a proof-of-use
stage, where a concept is making a sustained, real-world impact independent of research (Nunamaker and
Briggs 2011; Nunamaker et al. 2013). Because of the broad nature of the research approach, contributions
stemming from the high-impact DSR framework may reference many disciplines, can affect multiple
disciplines, and can have a broad range, including contributions such as practical field observations, new
or refined theory, new or refined methods, new or refined design specifications, or a nascent
understanding of a new problem space.
The current study represents one part of a larger program of research focused on systems approaches to
credibility assessment. In line with the research approach, this program of research heavily pulls from
psychology, communication, psychophysiology, cognitive science, and criminal justice in combination
with information systems literature.
Because of the relative novelty of the problem space, a laboratory experiment was an appropriate method
of investigation at this stage. An experiment was designed to evaluate the ability of deceivers to succesfully
bypass the automated screening system through the use of countermeasures. The experimental task was
patterned after a number of experiments designed to test the ability of noninvasive sensors to identify
deception and concealed information. This was intentional as the findings of previous work could then be
compared to the results of this study. The experient was comprised of 4 guilty and 1 control condition.
Three of the four guilty treatments entailed learning countermeasures to defeat the system. Measures were
repeated within subjects and within question for a total of 20 cases per individual. Detailed information
about the data collection process and the experimental task is provided in the following subsections.

Participants
Participants were recruited from undergraduate and graduate business courses at a large southwestern
university. While the ideal population would be individuals who regularly participate in illicit activities,
such a population was not feasibly obtainable. Students were selected as a target population as they are
comprised of individuals from a diverse set of ethnic and cultural backgrounds. Participants (N=175)
consented to participate and subsequently completed the experiment. The mean age of participants was
21.86, with a median age of 21, a minimum age of 18, and a maximum age of 36. The sample was
comprised of individuals with a diverse range of ethnic backgrounds, including: 33% Asian, 3% Black, 1%
Hawaiian/Islander, 46% White, 13% Hispanic, 3% Middle Eastern, and 1% other. Males accounted for
59% of the total participants; 41% were female. Over half (126) of the participants spoke english as a
second language. Of the initial 175 participants, 18 were disqualified because they either failed two
manipulation check questions or they did not follow instructions (e.g., failed to construct the device).
Participants received course credit for participation, as well as $20 if they successfully made it through the
checkpoint and completed their task without arousing suspicion. This was a mild deception to encourage
personal investment; in reality no participants were required to complete their task beyond the screening
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Experiment Task
Each participant was required to provide written consent prior to beginning the experiment. The
experimental task mirrored Twyman et al. (2011a), except there were additional conditions. After
providing consent, each individual was randomly assigned to one of the following five conditions: guilty
with no countermeasures, guilty with mental countermeasures, guilty with physical countermeasures,
guilty with all (mental, physical, and additional countermeasures), and an innocent (control) group. The
number of participants assigned to each group was roughly equal.
Participants in the guilty conditions were tasked with constructing an improvised explosive device,
concealing it in a bag with standard travel items, and delivering the bag to a person in a secure portion of a
building. Participants randomly assigned to one of the three countermeasures groups also constructed the
improvised explosive device and packed it in a bag; however, they also completed training on how to use
countermeasures to defeat the system. Members of the control group packed only innocuous household
items in a bag prior to proceeding to the simulated screening; they did not receive any information about
the system or countermeasures training. After packing the bag, they proceeded to the simulated screening
environment, purportedly to security screening prior to entry.

Figure 1. Improvised Explosive Device built by participants in Guilty conditions
Countermeasures training entailed watching a video describing the sensors that would be used during the
screening interview to identify deception, as well as methods that could be used to thwart the effectiveness
of the sensors. Participants in the mental countermeasures group were instructed to count backwards by
seven from a three-digit number. This tactic is designed to occupy the interviewee’s mental processes,
rendering them cognitively “numb” to the interviewee that is taking place, minimizing any behavioral or
physiological differences in behavior that could occur. Participants in the physical countermeasures group
were instructed to moderately but carefully bite their tongue when control items were presented during
the interview, resulting in physiological responses on control items that could mimic the expected
response of a guilty person to an item of interest. This should result in a false negative classification as the
guilty participant should appear more concered about control items than items of interest, and would thus
appear innocent. The final countermeasures group was trained to use the mental and physical
countermeasures described previously, as well as to directly controlt kinesic rigidity (not “freeze up”),
control their voice pitch such that it is always the same, keep a neutral facial expression, and to look at all
images naturally, not focusing on one item on the screen more than another.
All participants entered the screening environment, placed the packed bag on a counter, and stood in front
of the automated screening system. The system was designed to identify the presence of an interviewee
and begin the interview autonomously. The first step of the interview entailed calibration of the
interviewee to the eye tracking device. During this process, the person must fixate their eye gaze on nine
different locations on the screen, resulting in a more accurate and consistent oculometric data collection.
After calibration, the screening interview commenced, which entailed displaying 5 slides containing
images of banned items to the interviewee. Each slide contained four small images of banned items
(Figure 2), and an embodied conversational agent (ECA) asked the interviewee “Are you carrying any of
these items?” immediately prior to the display of each screen. The interviewee was given five seconds to
respond before the question repeated and the next slide appeared. Participants were asked to vocally
respond either yes or no. One of the five slides contained the target item, which was an image that
resembled an explosive device. Participants in the guilty conditions had to verbally lie in response to this
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question to appear truthful. The five-slide (foil) was repeated four times, with the slide order and the
spatial location of the images randomly changed each time. In total, each participant responded to 20
questions, four of which required an outright lie.

Figure 2. Example slide used in the automated screening
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Figure 3. Automated screening kiosk used to question participants
After the screening, each participant completed a brief survey designed to check experimental
manipulations and to collect information on their experience during the interview.

Measures
Kinesic data was captured using a Microsoft Kinect sensor, by capturing the 3-dimensional cartesian
coordinates of 20 distinct body points in real time at approximately 30 Hz. This raw data was used to
calculate overall movement via the same procedure detailed in previous work on automated rigidity
detection (Twyman 2012; Twyman et al. 2011b). This raw data was averaged by participant (N=157) and
slide (N=20) for each body point. There was one case of lost data due to malfunction, leaving 62,780 data
points.
Pupillometry was measured via an EyeTech TM3 eye tracking sensor. The TM3 captured pupil diameter at
approximately 30 Hz. The mean pupil diameter for both eyes was calculated for each measurement, then
this data was likewise summarized by participant and slide. Technical malfunctions occurred on 2.6% of
slides, leaving 3,058 usable data points.
Raw vocal data was captured using an array microphone at 48 kHz. For each response, the maximum,
mean, and standard deviation of vocal pitch from the beginning to the end of an utterance of a “no”
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response, were extracted from the raw vocal data. Technical malfunctions occurred on 5.6% of slides,
leaving 2,994 usable data points.
To control for effects stemming from highly variable interpersonal differences such wide variance in
nervousness, stillness, eye size, and vocal range, the data points from each of these indicators were
standardized using within-subject z-scores (Ben-Shakhar 1985), meaning each subject’s observations were
representative of a personal baseline as opposed to a population baseline. All observations were also
standardized within-foil, to take advantage of the question-specific baseline. In the case of body
movement, movement was also standardized for each body point separately to account for natural
differences in movement patterns between body points.

Analysis and Results
Because of the relative novelty of vocal measurements in a CIT context, vocal pitch variation underwent a
preliminary analysis to explore the three possible measures of variation. Then, separate multilevel
regression analyses were performed for each veracity cue.
The vocal measures investigated were: mean pitch, pitch standard deviation, and max pitch. As with body
movement and pupil dilation cues, each of these variables were normalized within subject and foil before
being submitted to repeated measures ANOVA (Condition X Target Item). The interaction of Condition
and Target Item was not significant for mean pitch (p=.28) or pitch standard deviation (p=.065). Max
pitch, a measurement of high-end pitch range, was significant for the Condition and Target interaction,
F(4, 2989)=2.32, p=.05.
For each target deception indicator of interest, a multilevel regression model was specified with the
indicator as the dependent variable. The dependent variables are standardized scores and thus represent
standard deviations from an individual’s baseline. In each case, the independent variables include Target
Item (a binary variable indicating whether the stimuli slide included an IED image), Time (a value
between 1 and 4 representing the temporal order of the four foils), and the Condition (the four guilty
conditions were dummy coded using the Innocent condition as a baseline). Interaction effects between
Condition and Target Item were included to test hypotheses. The results of the separate multilevel models
are in Table 1.
Table 1. Overall Movement: Multilevel Regression Model Results

Fixed Effects
(Intercept)
Target Item
Time
Guilt
Mental Countermeasures (MC)
Physical Countermeasures (PC)
All Countermeasures (AC)
Guilt X Target Item

Overall
Movement

Pupil
Diameter

Max Vocal
Pitch


(S. E.)


(S. E.)


(S. E.)

0.007
(0.010)
-0.026
(0.019)
0.000
(0.001)
0.015
(0.012)
0.019
(0.013)
0.041**
(0.013)
0.013
(0.012)
-0.076**
(0.027)
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0.090*
(0.045)
-0.074
(0.082)
-0.008**
(0.003)
-0.123*
(0.053)
-0.167**
(0.054)
-0.128*
(0.054)
-0.204***
(0.054)
0.611***
(0.119)

0.077
(0.047)
-0.247**
(0.086)
-0.003
(0.003)
-0.061
(0.056)
-0.049
(0.057)
-0.070
(0.057)
-0.040
(0.056)
0.304*
(0.124)

MC X Target Item
PC X Target Item
AC X Target Item

N

-0.097***
(0.028)
-0.203***
(0.028)
-0.063*
(0.028)

0.835***
(0.121)
0.639***
(0.121)
1.022***
(0.121)

0.243
(0.130)
0.348**
(0.128)
0.198
(0.126)

62780

3058

2994

* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; models fit using maximum likelihood
Each model was compared to an unconditional multilevel regression model that excluded fixed effects,
and each explained significantly more variance. The unconditional model partitions the variance across
participants unconditioned by predictor variables. Comparing the unconditional models against each of
the models allows for testing if the inclusion of the predictors significantly improves the fit of the model to
the data (Singer and Willett 2003) before examining the fixed effects.

Kinesic Rigidity
Kinesic rigidity was detected among all groups who were smuggling the IED. When the target item was
present on the screen, Guilty (b=-0.076, p=.006), physical countermeasures (b=-.203, p=.000), mental
countermeasures (b=-.097, p=.001), and all countermeasures (b=-.063, p=.024) groups exhibited rigidity.
Those performing only physical countermeasures showed the greatest amount of rigidity, large enough to
create a significant net positive main effect in that condition because of the standardized scoring method.

Pupil Diameter
When the target item (IED image) was displayed on the screen while an examinee responded to a
question, pupil dilation was significantly larger for participants in the Guilty (b=.611, p<.001), mental
countermeasures (b=.835, p<.001), physical countermeasures (b=.639, p<.001) and all countermeasures
(b=1.022, p< .001) group, which showed the largest effect. There were relatively narrow pupil main effects
of each condition resulting from the pronounced pupil dilation that occurred when target items were
present, since all items were standardized within foil.

Vocal Pitch Variation
Max pitch was selected as the dependent variable for vocal pitch variation in the multilevel regression
model detailed in Table 1. Both physical (b=.348, p=.007) and guilty without countermeasures (b=.304,
p=.014) conditions demonstrated increases in max pitch when responding to target items. The mental
countermeasures condition did not achieve significance, b=.24, p=.06. The condition using several
countermeasures was not significantly different from the innocent condition, b= .19, p=.12.

Discussion
This study was a novel examination of countermeasures in automated interviewing systems, an emerging
paradigm in IS research. This is also the first study exploring a systems solution to countermeasures in the
field of automated credibility assessment. Traditional countermeasures had limited effectiveness against
automated interviewing systems in CIT-driven interviews. The results also suggest that there is potential
in the proposition that tracking multiple heterogeneous veracity cues will decrease the effectiveness of
countermeasures.

Summary of Results
Overall body movement and pupil dilation had been investigated in CIT interviews previously, and the
results replicated prior work showing kinesic rigidity (H4) and dilated pupils (H1) during presentation of
target items. Traditional countermeasures were not effective at countering these behavioral and
physiological responses, in agreement with rigidity predictions (H5) but contrary to expectations for pupil
dilation (H2, H3). Pupil dilation was the strongest effect among those investigated and appeared to be the
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most resilient to countermeasures. The pupil dilation resulting from the orienting response was strong,
and there was no decrease in this effect when mental distraction or pain was used.
Vocalic features had been explored in alternative interviewing protocols, and those studies indicated
variation in vocal pitch stemming from increased anxiety or tension may be exhibited in CIT responding.
Participants in the guilty with no countermeasures condition exhibited greater variation in max vocal
pitch, as did those in the physical countermeasures condition, as hypothesized (H6, H8). The prediction
that vocalic variance changes could be countered by mental countermeasures (H7) was supported.
The vocal findings from this study reveal that max vocal pitch could be used to discriminate between guilty
and innocent speakers during a traditional or automated CIT. When countermeasures are employed, the
effective method against vocal detection was using mental countermeasures. Mental countermeasures
were successful even when employing many countermeasures at the same time, possibly suggesting that
individuals find vocal manipulation easier than other countermeasures such as controlling body
movement or pupil dilation.
Attempting many countermeasures at the same time proved difficult. When individuals tried to control
many things at once, the pupil dilation effect was strongest. Physical countermeasures produced the
strongest levels of rigidity. These findings may be used used to detect specific countermeasures.

Contributions
By investigating countermeasures in a new domain (automated screening systems using non-contact
sensors), this IS study is breaking new ground. However, we should learn from related work that has
sought to approach the countermeasures problem. Frequently, when new tests or protocols are developed,
they are initially claimed to be resistant to countermeasures (e.g., Lykken 1960; Rosenfeld and Labkovsky
2010a; Rosenfeld et al. 2008). In many cases, the matter is not that countermeasures will not work, but
simply that the same countermeasures previously employed in other deception detection tests do not
apply in the new test. Lykken (1960) claimed that the newly developed CIT (then called the Guilty
Knowledge Test) was resistant to countermeasures. Later, several countermeasures were shown to reduce
the accuracy of Lykken’s CIT method (Honts et al. 1996) using the polygraph. The same phenomenon
occurred in the P300 based test with the advent of the Complex Trial Protocol (Rosenfeld et al. 2008). The
countermeasures previously used on the P300 were shown to be easily detected using the new protocol.
However, Sokolovsky et al. (2011) and Hu et al. (2011) both showed that a slightly modified version of the
countermeasure was able to reduce accuracy substantially.
The approach to countermeasures in this study took a similar approach, but with an added
systems-inspired proposition—triangulating on deception through measurement of multiple behavioral
and psychophysiological anomalies simultaneously. The findings presented in this paper suggest that this
approach may be effective in some areas (e.g., pupil dilation and body movement), but not others (e.g.,
vocal pitch). The results are promising enough to justify additional research investigating countermeasure
combinations at a more granular level.
The study presented in this paper makes an important contribution to IS credibility assessment literature
as it contains a seminal evaluation of the effectiveness of countermeasures against systems designed to
identify deception and concealed information in an automated credibility assessment context.
Technologies that can identify deception and concealed information rapidly and without contact have the
potential to be used in a variety of interviewing and screening contexts, changing how integrity and
security are managed. As with the polygraph, these new credibility assessment systems will encounter
some individuals who will attempt to mitigate their effectiveness through the use of countermeasures.
Ultimately, the results of this study will feed back into the system design, driving revised detection
algorithms, refined interactions, and key procedural modifications. Thus, this study represents one step in
a much larger effort to create system-driven solutions to credibility assessment.

Limitations and Future Directions
One limitation of this work is the set of countermeasures used by participants in the countermeasures
treatments. The countermeasures taught to participants had been identified in previous deception
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literature, however, these countermeasures were traditionally employed to thwart polygraph
examinations. While the concept of using countermeasures to create bogus physiological and behavioral
responses certainly applies to the sensors used in this study, there may exist additional countermeasures
more suited for use against sensors not requiring contact with the interviewee. As such, an area of future
research is the identification of new types of countermeasures that may be employed specifically for use
against the sensors evaluated in this research. Future work should also assess the effectiveness of these
novel countermeasures.
Training is a particular limitation of this study, since participants had but a few minutes to learn
countermeasures and practice them on their own. It is reasonable to believe that countermeasure
effectiveness may improve with greater training and practice, and future studies should examine the
effects of various levels of training. However, relatively small amounts of practice represents the large
majority of real-world attempts to counter credibility assessment interviews. Individuals rarely train for
extended periods before taking a polygraph exam or smuggling illicit items into a sports arena or secure
building. Nevertheless, highly motivated individuals will do extensive training, and the effectiveness of
such training is an open area of research. Future research can examine this using an experimental design
similar to the current study, but including varying levels of training and practice.
Another type of countermeasures less commonly studied in academic literature is the chemical
countermeasure. Bradley and Ainsworth (1984) studied the effects of intoxication during the crime on the
detection of deception during both the CIT and CQT following the crime. Intoxication during the
commission of the crime reduced the detection accuracy of both tests as compared to sober participants.
There are significant ethical challenges to conducting examinations of chemical-based countermeasures
which prevented our including them in this round. However, future research will need to address this
issue, perhaps via a standoff intoxication identification function.
Finally, another area of future research is investigating the interrelationships between disparate cues of
deception, correlating newly identified cues in automated screening with validated deception detection
cues such as electrodermal variation. Simultaneously collecting behavioral and psychophysiological data
using a variety of sensors should yield new insights regarding the underlying relationships of the
mechanisms triggering certain responses associated with deception. Insights gleaned in this area will yield
important findings not only for improving detection accuracy but also illuminating theoretical
understanding of deception and its accompanying cues.

Conclusion
This study examined the effectiveness of countermeasures in the newly emerging field of automated
human interviewing systems. These new systems employ non-traditional measurement and new
techniques, and the effectiveness of countermeasures was unknown. The results show that traditional
countermeasures were largely ineffective, as were attempts to also employ direct countermeasures
alongside traditional ones. Future research will seek to further confirm the notion that an effective system
for combating countermeasures is one that tracks multiple, distince psychophysiological and behavioral
indicators of deception simultaneously.
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